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RECRUITMENT FOR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Scope

It is proposed to examine a representative group of cases involving Americans who have participated in Soviet intelligence operations in the United States and to observe the methods whereby they were recruited for this work. No attempt will be made to deal with the Soviet operating cadre; that is, Soviet personnel who supervised operations. This memorandum will be confined to the mechanics of building networks around the Soviet cadre.

Much has been written concerning individual incentives among those successfully recruited by Soviet Intelligence, and, insofar as possible, the field of psychological study will be avoided in this paper. It is necessary, however, to classify the basic motivations since the Soviet method of recruitment is largely dependent upon the "political maturity" of a candidate. In the Russian view, a convinced and trusted Communist has reached full political maturity, meaning he will render any service asked of him, including espionage. Non-Communists in differing grades of development must be subjected to differing types and degrees of persuasion.

Treatment

It is believed that there is a general understanding of the influence of Communist ideology in conditioning Soviet intelligence recruits, and while this study will add some emphasis to the general rule that the Communist Party is the main recruiting base, it will also be shown that the Soviets had other valuable areas of recruitment.

Little attention has been directed to the role of mercenaries in Soviet operations, and while such incentive has been of less importance than the ideological, it nonetheless has figured and should be given our consideration. Thus, the study is divided into those whose recruitment was accomplished through ideological considerations and those who were enlisted for material reasons.

It should also be stated at the outset that the Soviet services have consistently tried to compromise ideological recruits with money at the earliest opportunity, apparently in order to maintain control over them. That this is the purpose is indicated in Soviet insistence upon obtaining written receipts when such payments are made. This leads to a consideration of another type of motivation: coercion. Once a recruit has been compromised, threats of disclosure and implications of physical reprisal may be used to keep him in Soviet control. An analysis of such techniques would involve a study of general operating methods, beyond the scope of this study which will be limited to the initial persuasion and the methods of introducing candidates into the work.

I. Ideological Recruitment

Successful operations of Soviet Intelligence in the United States, have, for the most part, been performed by networks recruited along ideological lines. There is, however, a wide range in ideological development: open Communist Party members, concealed Communist Party members, partyless Marxists and Russophiles. By the act of accepting membership in the Communist Party, open or concealed, an individual places himself under discipline. Therefore, recruitment of disciplined Communists must be considered as distinct from that of non-Communists, even those non-Communists who, although convinced of the validity of Marxism-Leninism, have not subjected their wills to the will of the Party.

A. Recruitment from the Communist Party

It is not feasible to go into every aspect of the relationship of the Communist Party, USA with the Soviet Intelligence Services. These are many, and complex. For example, the indoctrination of a Party member in Marxism-Leninism is in itself a contribution to Soviet Intelligence, in developing potential candidates for the Russian Services. There are, however, certain immediate and direct contributions which should be considered.

The question of the enlistment of Communist Party members into Soviet intelligence work is more a problem of selection than a problem of recruitment. It is the function of a Communist to aid the Soviet Union in every way. Thus, the convinced Communist does not have to be recruited by the Soviet Intelligence Services. He must only be placed in a position where his services can be useful.

Once this is understood, the study of recruitment among Party members becomes more correctly a study of the relationship between the Intelligence Services and the Party -- the latter in a sense serving as an agency of Soviet Intelligence.

1. In some instances this agency has been asserted in the form of direct instructions issued by a Communist Party official to a subordinate member:

Whittaker Chambers, a member of the Communist Party in 1932, was told by Max Bedacht, a member of the Central Committee, Communist Party, USA, that he had been selected for underground work. He was given no explanation of what his duties were to be. Chambers asked Bedacht for time to think the matter over, and, on the following day, after consulting his wife, informed Bedacht he did not wish to take the assignment. Whereupon Bedacht told him he had no choice, and the same day introduced Chambers to John Leemis Sherman, a former fellow employee on the "Daily Worker," who ostensibly had been expelled from the Communist Party in 1929. Chambers was introduced by Sherman to the first of his Russian superiors and thus began his work for Soviet Intelligence.

Louis Budenz. One of the several fields in which Soviet Intelligence was particularly active during the late 1930's was the penetration of the Socialist Workers Party (Trotskyite). Several operations were undertaken to infiltrate this movement and Soviet Intelligence recruited directly from the ranks of the Communist Party in some of these operations.

Prior to joining the Communist Party, in 1935, Louis Budenz had become familiar with some aspects of the SWP movement, a fact which became known to Jacob Golos,

whom Budenz knew as a member of the influential Communist Party Control Commission. Golos introduced Budenz to a Soviet Intelligence representative in 1936 and for about three years thereafter Budenz met regularly with a succession of Russian intelligence officials, aiding them in selecting personnel for this penetration operation. Two of his selections were highly successful as will be seen in the following:

✓ Sylvia Callen. One of the Russian officials under whom Budenz worked was Dr. Gregory Rabinovitch, ostensibly assigned to the United States as the Soviet Red Cross representative. Rabinovitch asked Budenz to select a Communist who could be placed in a clerical position in the national headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party. Through Communist Party officials in Chicago Budenz learned of Sylvia Callen, who, although a Communist, had succeeded in joining the Socialist Workers Party in a Communist Party infiltration operation. Communist officials in Chicago, not aware of the nature of her new assignment, were most reluctant to lose Sylvia's services, but, since Budenz was authorized to speak in the name of the Central Committee, he prevailed over their objections. Callen was introduced to Rabinovitch and under the latter's instructions she proceeded to New York City, "volunteered" her services to the national headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party and from 1938 until 1947 acted as personal secretary to James P. Cannon, General Secretary of the SWP.

✓ Ruby Weil. The Communist Party also contributed Ruby Weil to Rabinovitch's operations, and the task she carried out successfully led to the assassination of Leon Trotsky. Budenz selected Ruby out of Party ranks as having connections useful to SWP penetration and introduced her to Rabinovitch. Ruby's chief asset was her past acquaintance with the Ageloff sisters, one of whom (Ruth) was Leon Trotsky's personal secretary. Rabinovitch instructed Ruby to reestablish her acquaintanceship with the Ageloffs and she succeeded in developing a close friendship with Sylvia Ageloff. Ruby accompanied Sylvia to Europe during the Summer of 1937, where the latter attended a convention of the Fourth International at Paris.

While in Europe Ruby introduced Sylvia to the man who has become best known as Frank Jacobs, and with this completed her assignment. Through his subsequent association with Sylvia Ageleff, Jacobs was able to become an accepted member of the Trotsky household in Mexico and in August, 1940 murdered Leon Trotsky. Neither Budenz nor Ruby knew the long range plan they set in motion in 1937.

2. Another direct contribution made by the Communist Party to Soviet Intelligence has been the role of the Party in acting as a channel by which devoted Communists were able to put themselves in contact with Soviet Intelligence officials and to volunteer their services:

Elizabeth Bentley. Miss Bentley initiated her activity in the intelligence field through the Communist Party. When she was employed at the Italian Library of Information in New York City in 1938, she had available to her information she believed would be of value to the Italian Communist Party. Through her local Party branch, Miss Bentley made contact with "F. Brown" at national headquarters of the Communist Party, USA, and began to supply him with information. "F. Brown" is the name formerly used by Ferruccio Martini, head of the Italian Section of the Communist Party, USA. Subsequently, having the impression that Brown was not making full use of her material, she asked to be put in touch with "the underground." At that time she, of course, did not know the Russian espionage set-up. She knew only of the existence of clandestine channels. As a result of her request, Miss Bentley was introduced to Jacob Golos, referred to in the foregoing in connection with the recruitment of Budenz.

Golos and Miss Bentley established a close personal relationship during the succeeding two years and in 1941 he assigned her to act as his liaison agent with a newly established network among government employees in Washington, D. C. Golos controlled this newly established network, furnishing its production to an unidentified Soviet espionage contact, until he died in 1943 when it was gradually broken up into smaller units and placed under the direct control of a Soviet-Intelligence official.

Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. Silvermaster also is reported to have initiated his connection with Russian Intelligence through the Communist Party, USA. In June, 1941 he was employed by the Farm Security Administration in Washington, D. C. Elizabeth Bentley states Silvermaster later told her that shortly after Germany invaded Russia he visited Earl Browder, then General Secretary of the Party, and, in order to lend active aid to the USSR, asked to be placed in contact with someone who could transmit intelligence to that country. This was the beginning of the intelligence operation in Washington described by Miss Bentley in which she acted as a liaison agent under the supervision of Jacob Golos.

Julius Rosenberg. Rosenberg, who in April, 1951 was convicted of espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union, initiated his connection with Soviet Intelligence. In seeking to enlist David Greenglass, employed at the Los Alamos installation of the Atomic Bomb Project, into his network, Rosenberg, in November, 1944 talked with Ruth Greenglass, David's wife. At that time, Rosenberg suggested Ruth may have noticed that he had disassociated himself from open Communist Party activity. He explained that he had always wanted to do more than just be a member of the Communist Party, that he searched for two years to place himself in contact with the Russian "underground." Although Rosenberg did not indicate the means by which he finally established contact, it can be assumed the channel was provided by the Communist Party.

3. The establishment of secret units of the Communist Party, USA, provided a pool of select talent from which the Soviet Intelligence Services drew recruits:

Another important and direct contribution made by the Communist Party to Soviet Intelligence operations was the establishment of secret units of the Party, frequently referred to as "the underground." J. Peters, who held no formal office in the Communist Party, USA, but who was a recognized authority in the Communist movement in the United States, reportedly headed the formation of secret units during the early and mid-nineteen thirties. It is not clear whether Peters, in forming these groups, was acting solely on the authority of the American

Communist Party. Such a group, and probably the most important, was established in Washington in 1933. Whittaker Chambers was designated by Peters to maintain contact with the Washington unit, composed of employees of government agencies. Chambers has stated that in the beginning its purpose was to organize Communists in the government and to increase Communist influence in government. Clearly, in 1936, Soviet Intelligence invaded this unit and recruited some of its members for espionage.

A Soviet Intelligence official who has come to be known under the name of Boris Bykov, on his arrival in the United States in 1936 met with Peters and Chambers. He promptly disclosed an interest in the secret Washington unit. Chambers states that while Peters opposed it to some extent, Bykov selected and interviewed several members of the unit, including Henry Julian Wadleigh, Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. By early 1937 Bykov, with Chambers as his liaison man, was supervising a sizable network of select talent, which, according to the latter, included the foregoing three and other members of the secret Party organization in Washington.

The secret Party organization was also the basis of the Golos-Bentley operation in Washington, as described by Miss Bentley. She states that when she was first assigned to meet with Nathan Gregory Silvermaster in August, 1941, she was instructed to obtain from him intelligence which he personally procured and that which he collected from his associates. From time to time she met others in Washington, on instruction from Golos--people connected with the Party underground, who were in positions to provide intelligence. Thus, Miss Bentley states, by 1943 she was operating several groups in addition to the one she referred to as the Silvermaster group. It is of interest to note that many of her sources were not aware of the destination of the material being furnished, believing it to be going to the Communist Party, USA.

It is also of interest to observe that Miss Bentley's operation had an unusual character, in that, she served the dual role of a Communist organizer and an espionage courier. She was under instructions from

Golos to collect Party dues, and to deliver Communist literature to her Washington contacts. This is not in accordance with the usual Soviet Intelligence custom of divorcing intelligence activity from Party activity. It can only be explained by Golos' unique position in Soviet Intelligence. When Golos died in 1943 the Intelligence Service began taking steps to remove the operation from Communist Party control. Miss Bentley was stripped of her contact, one after the other. The Intelligence officials for whom she worked after Golos' death, "Bill" and "Jack", went to some lengths to explain to her that security considerations required that her groups be split up, isolating one from another. It appears likely, however, that the real purpose was to isolate them from Miss Bentley, who still represented Party control. In September, 1944 "Bill", according to Miss Bentley, personally took over direction of the Silvermaster Group, and in early 1945 she was relieved of the remainder of her Washington assignments by "Jack." For several months thereafter she continued to meet with a Soviet Intelligence official, but received no assignments. Thus, the Soviet Intelligence organization was successful in getting direct control of the Washington operation.

B. Ideological Recruitment of Non-Communists.

A study of recruitment practices discloses that Soviet Intelligence officials have encountered considerable success in enlisting non-Communists into intelligence work along ideological lines. Whereas, in the case of Party members, the Intelligence Services had a direct avenue of approach in the highly disciplined open and concealed units of the Communist Party, no organizational channel is available for the enlistment of the non-Communists. Personal relationships account for recruitment in this category, relationships which frequently are the product of similar political beliefs.

Widely varying degrees of ideological development are observed in considering this general category, ranging from convinced Marxists who, for one reason or another, have not seen fit to join the Communist Party, to the politically uninitiated who entertained simply a desire to aid the Russian people. The recruitment procedure, therefore, depends upon three factors:

(1) The degree of ideological development, (2) the character of the personal relationship between the recruiter and the candidate, and (3) the manner in which the particular Soviet superior in charge of the operation proceeds. With respect to this last factor, one Soviet official may disregard basic security consideration in favor of quick action, and another may proceed cautiously and work with great patience.

In view of these three variants, it is impossible to set down rules of recruitment with this category. There is, however, a definite pattern, concerning which the following observations may be made:

1. The initial approach is characterized by a high moral purpose, with humanity to be the beneficiary of the work the candidate is being requested to undertake: to aid in the fight against Fascism; to aid the struggling Russian people, or to aid in bringing about a greater exchange of scientific knowledge for the common good.
2. A gradual attempt is made to corrupt the recruit with money. At first, only expense money is suggested - later, a degree of economic dependence is cultivated. Written receipts are almost always obtained, with which the Soviet network can later threaten exposure. Eventually, it is intended to completely control the recruit.
3. Another aspect of this pattern should be mentioned since it is frequently present: deception in the initial approach. The fact that Soviet Intelligence inspired the approach is concealed and the first request usually is for aid of ostensibly legal character. An effort is made to avoid confronting the candidate with a clear-cut decision involving traitorous activity. His decision will have to be made at a later date when he, for the first time, realizes that he has become

involved in a Soviet Intelligence network. It will then be a decision of whether or not to continue such activities.

Much has been written in recent years on this phase of Soviet recruitment. The Report of the Royal Commission, concerning Soviet Espionage in Canada, dealt with this problem quite fully. Numerous analyses of motivation and technique have been devoted to this problem in the press. It is believed that there is a general understanding of the effect of ideological persuasion on people in this category. It would be repetitious to go into these processes here and this study will refrain from doing so except to point out that certain recent and well publicized cases have a relation to the pattern outlined above:

Harry Gold professed to be motivated initially by a desire to aid the Russian people to improve their lot. When, in 1935, he was first recruited, he was asked only to provide material on industrial processes which he himself had developed. No classified data was sought. Gradually, he was induced to accept money and to act as a liaison agent with other sources. He stated that by the time he was assigned to contact Klaus Fuchs for the Russian network, he was "in too deep to get out."

Alfred Dean Slack also professed that initially he was persuaded that he could aid the Russian people by furnishing industrial data. Here again no classified disclosures were involved in the beginning. The persuasion was voiced by Richard Briggs with whom Slack had associated in Socialist activity many years before. He accepted expense money and was gradually induced to make contact with others who could furnish industrial data. When in 1944 he was employed at the Holston Ordnance Works at Kingsport, Tennessee, and the Russians sought him out, requesting the classified formula for the explosive RDX, he felt he was in no position to turn them down.

II. MERCENARIES

As observed in the introduction to this memorandum, the Soviet intelligence services have used mercenaries in their operations to a considerable extent and, while their services have been of less value to the Soviets than the services of ideological recruits when taken as a whole, nevertheless, they have made a considerable contribution.

It is important to observe at the outset that the use of mercenaries has been almost exclusively associated with the operations of Soviet Intelligence officials connected with Soviet commercial missions to the United States: Amtorg Trading Company, at New York City, the wartime Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, and the Soviet travel agency, Intourist. These agencies were utilized for cover purposes by Soviet Intelligence and provided excellent avenues for making contacts in the field of industrial intelligence. Two of the more notable examples of Soviet officials involved in this type of operation were Gaik B. Ovakimian and Semen M. Semenov. Ovakimian arrived in the United States in 1933 as an Amtorg official and continued his connection with Amtorg until his departure in July, 1941. An FBI investigation initiated in the late nineteen thirties, disclosed him to be in charge of a wide-spread espionage operation and this investigation culminated in his arrest in 1941 in a Foreign Agents Registration Act case. A diplomatic exchange ensued and Ovakimian was permitted to depart from the United States in July, 1941. A reliable source, who at that time was an official of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, has stated that his headquarters in Moscow received a cable from the Military Intelligence resident in New York City advising of the arrest in the United States of the chief resident of the State Security Service (at that time known as GUGB, and now known as MGB.) State Security included then, and still does, the Soviet Union's primary foreign intelligence organization.

Semenov, it will be recalled, was the Soviet official under whose instructions Harry Gold first established contact with the nuclear scientist Klaus Fuchs. Thus, Ovakinian and Semenov are disclosed to have been important intelligence officials. It is, therefore, of interest to observe some of their "commercial" transactions - almost open dealings with American businessmen and employees of industrial concerns.

It will also be observed that some of the industrial intelligence thus procured was of an unclassified nature. Nonetheless it was of great value in Soviet military preparations.

Simon Rosenberg. Rosenberg was one of the first Americans utilized by Ovakinian after his arrival to the United States in 1939. As a member of a network established by the latter, Rosenberg developed and handled a group of contacts who were furnishing him plans and specification of industrial equipment being manufactured in mid-Western steel mills. Rosenberg's contacts were among shop personnel, none of whom were Communists and none of whom were authorized to conduct any transactions for their firms. According to Rosenberg, their incentives were exclusively mercenary. Instructions came down from Ovakinian as to what information was sought and Rosenberg went out and bought it from his group of sources. This operation continued until at least 1937.

Maurice Bacon Cooke. One of Ovakinian's principal interests, in the late 1930s, was in technical information on the production of high octane gasoline. Russian shortages in this field persisted during World War II and it can be seen that this was an intelligence target of first importance. Ovakinian's dealings with Maurice Bacon Cooke are of interest in this connection. Cooke, an industrial chemist, met Ovakinian during the middle 1930s while seeking Amtorg contracts for an industrial concern which he represented. Cooke claims he was subsequently hired by Amtorg Trading Company to act as a consultant,

to advise Amtorg on purchases. In 1939 Cooke was employed as a sales representative by M. W. Kellogg Company. He continued his association with Amtorg, specifically with Gaik Ovakimian, furnishing the latter with reports he obtained from material available to him at M. W. Kellogg Company. These data generally concerned construction of oil refining plants and processes in use therein. Cooke was not authorized by M. W. Kellogg to do business with Amtorg on these matters, nor was the company aware that he was supplying such information.

Cooke has admitted that he received \$14,750 in cash (no checks) in payment for his "consulting" work from Ovakimian in 1940. Evidence that this was an intelligence operation is seen in the circumstances surrounding a delivery of material from Cooke to Ovakimian on February 17, 1941. Cooke placed a roll of microfilm containing data on oil refining in a parcel locker in a New York subway station. Later in the day he gave Ovakimian the key to this locker. He admitted signing a receipt for \$700 for Ovakimian at the time he transferred the key to the latter, while at the same time denying flatly that he in fact received any money. Following his meeting with Cooke, Ovakimian went to the parcel locker, picked up the microfilm, and proceeded to the Soviet Consulate in New York City.

In explaining his relationship with Ovakimian, Cooke claimed no ideological influence, and he is not known to have had any connection with Communist or pro-Soviet organizations. Considering Ovakimian's status as a GUGB Resident, it is clear that he was engaged with Cooke in a mercenary intelligence operation..

Eric L. Pridonoff. An example of almost open activity conducted by Semen M. Semenov is his attempt to recruit Eric L. Pridonoff, early in 1944, when the latter was employed by the Aerojet Engineering Company of Pasadena, California. If Pridonoff's account is truthful, Semenov did not take the customary precaution of dealing through a subordinate, such as Harry Gold,

who at the time was working under Semenov. On the contrary, Semenov, openly identifying himself, made an outright bid for classified information.

Early in 1944 Pridonoff was in New York City on business for the Aerojet firm, and he received a call from Semenov, who identified himself as a petroleum engineer for the Soviet Government. Pridonoff states he cannot account for the fact that Semenov singled him out. After a couple of preliminary meetings, which Pridonoff believes were for the purpose of sounding him out, Semenov inquired if he would do some research work, specifically on the type of fuel used in jet-propulsion engines. He accompanied this inquiry with an offer, according to Pridonoff, of \$5000. The latter states this was an obvious attempt to buy information since there was no research involved. Pridonoff knew what kind of fuel was used and could have told Semenov on the spot. He states he declined to furnish the information and suggested that Semenov go through regular intergovernment channels. Semenov indicated this involved "red tape" and he preferred the more direct method.

The timing of this approach to Pridonoff is of interest, since it was in late 1943 or early 1944 that Semenov first gave Harry Gold instructions for establishing contact with the nuclear scientist, Klaus Fuchs. Thus Semenov was simultaneously conducting the highly covert Fuchs-Gold operation and engaging in an almost open attempt to buy intelligence, which clearly shows that the employment of mercenaries was as much a part of Soviet Intelligence technique as the more standard ideological operation.

Howard Wellington Gochenour. As noted in the foregoing, Ouakimian and Semenov were jointly active in the collection of industrial intelligence and, while much of this was of an unclassified nature, nonetheless, it was highly regarded by the Russians. One such enterprise involved the collection of information on the manufacture of nylon.

One of Ouakimian's workers, Richard Briggs, referred to in the foregoing in connection with the recruitment of Alfred Dean Slack, established contact with Howard Wellington Gochenour, an employee of a Dupont Plant at Belle, West Virginia, although it is not clear whether Gochenour actually furnished Briggs information. Sometime after Briggs' death, which occurred in September, 1939, Harry Gold was instructed by his then superior, Semen Semenov, to contact Gochenour and get him to do a report on the manufacturing processes of nylon. Gold assigned Slack to make this contact and late in 1941 or early in 1942, the latter had a series of meetings with Gochenour. Gochenour agreed and did actually deliver to Slack a report on the nylon processes, for which Slack paid him about \$300. It had been agreed that Gochenour would receive \$1500 for this work, but the network was not satisfied with the quality of Gochenour's report, and the latter was not paid the balance.

Slack states that Gochenour was interested only in the money and that there was no ideological incentive. Slack states he believes that Gochenour was not concerned with the ultimate destination of the information which he furnished. Gochenour, on the other hand, while agreeing that he had a purely mercenary interest in his dealing with Slack, states he was under the impression that Slack represented the Eastman Kodak Company (by which firm Slack was actually employed), and that the report that he furnished would be used by that company. In either event, this case disclosed that the Russians could purchase industrial intelligence during that period with little difficulty.

Hafis Salich. Salich was born in Russia of middle-class parents who fled after the revolution and eventually settled on the West Coast of the United States. In 1935, when he was a member of the Berkeley, California, Police Department, Salich became acquainted with the Soviet Vice Council at San Francisco, Nicolai Aliudin. In 1936, Salich became an investigator for the Office of Naval Intelligence at Los Angeles,

continuing his acquaintance with Aliaudin. After the latter had been recalled to the Soviet Union, Salich was visited in December, 1937 or January, 1938 by Mikhail Gorin, a Soviet national, who was manager of the Soviet travel agency, Intourist, at Los Angeles. Gorin, after commenting on the fact that Salich's family had been found to have a good record in Russia, made a blunt proposal that Salich furnish him data on Japanese activities in the United States. Gorin argued that this would in no way injure the United States. Salich thought the matter over, and a short time later consented to the proposal. Thereafter, Salich furnished Gorin with reports and extracts from the files of ONI, which related to Japanese activities in the United States. At the same time Salich accepted money from Gorin, which he estimated amounted to \$1700 up to November, 1938. Gorin and Salich were convicted of espionage in January, 1939 in the Federal District Court, at Los Angeles.

Salich appears to have been motivated in collaborating with this Soviet official exclusively by money. He explained that he was hard pressed financially because of his domestic difficulties.

"Tem." The final example selected in this group of mercenaries is an individual, who will be referred to herein for security reasons as "Tem." Tem was an employee of West Coast aircraft firms and has admitted that he furnished information on military aircraft design to a Soviet network over a period covering about ten years, from the mid-nineteen thirties to the mid-nineteen forties. In the beginning Tem met a Soviet official who was connected with a delegation of Russian engineers touring American aviation plants and was invited to dinner by this official. Tem discussed designs he had been working on, of non-military nature, and offered to be of assistance to the Russians. A short time later the Soviet official, probably in the meantime having cleared Tem with Moscow and

having received authorization, asked Tom to put some of his ideas on paper and offered him \$200 for the first delivery "to put this on a business basis." Within a short time Tom's Soviet contact disclosed he was interested in military design. Possibly to facilitate this assignment, Tom moved to another plant which was working on military aircraft. He was given a Leica camera with which to copy documents, and he began transmitting classified information. A complete account of the money Tom received from the Soviet network is not available; however, in one instance he received \$1800 in a lump sum, and is known to have received regular payment before and after this settlement. Tom, in discussing his motivation in the beginning, states he felt "some measure of cooperation on my part would eventually result in furthering my own ambitions," clearly a mercenary inclination. He added that he also desired to aid Russia as against Germany and Japan, this being the only indication that Tom was concerned with ideological considerations.

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

There are some general observations which might be made, based on the foregoing analysis, respecting Soviet recruitment in the United States under present day conditions:

1. The membership of the Communist Party, USA will continue to be the main base of Soviet recruitment in this country. The Loyalty Program and general security checks to which employees in vital facilities are now subjected will make it more difficult for those with Communist connections to place themselves in sensitive positions. However, this will not prevent Communists from carrying out courier-liaison and supervisory tasks for intelligence networks. Hidden Communists whose connections have been carefully concealed for just this purpose will continue to be a principle threat to the intelligence security of the United States.

2. The number of non-Communists who are ideologically suited to recruitment for Soviet Intelligence has greatly diminished in the years since World War II. Many of the popular causes which enticed the politically uninitiated into pro-Soviet activity have now been exposed, as has the technique of enlisting such people into intelligence work. The most effective present day lure would appear to be the Soviet dominated "Peace" groups.

3. Mercenaries have always been employed by intelligence services, and they will continue to be used by the Soviet services. The risk being greater under present day conditions, the price will be set higher. However, the reduction of Soviet commercial activity in the United States since World War II will reduce the number of opportunities given Soviet Intelligence to enlist mercenaries.